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REGULATION OF INNOVATION UNDER FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS LEGISLATION:  
FDA EXCLUSIVITY AS AN EFFICIENT INCENTIVE MECHANISM 
 
Maxwell R. Morgan1 
As part of its broader effort to reform the American health care 
system, Congress has recently enacted legislation that creates a statutory 
pathway for FDA approval of generic “follow-on” biologics products.  A 
crucial debate leading up to the passage of this legislation was whether 
and to what extent it should provide originator biologics manufacturers 
with a period of FDA data exclusivity protection as an incentive for future 
innovation.  This debate was particularly significant because of the 
ongoing reevaluation in the United States of the appropriate role of patent 
law in fostering technological advance, with recent Supreme Court 
decisions indicating a trend towards retrenchment of the scope of available 
patent protections. In the end, the bill adopted by Congress and signed into 
law by President Obama affords manufacturers of new biologics products 
with 12 years of data exclusivity.   
The central thesis of this Article is that optimal biologics 
innovation policy would situate FDA exclusivity as the industry’s primary 
incentive mechanism, displacing patent law in that role.  The inclusion of 
a lengthy 12-year data exclusivity period in the newly enacted legislation 
is a laudable step in the right direction.  But reliance on patenting in the 
biologics innovation process would also likely have to be substantially 
curtailed in order to attain optimal levels of innovation.  If this were 
achieved, FDA exclusivity would act as an adequate surrogate for the 
incentives offered by patents, while a number of pathologies currently 
associated with patenting in the biomedical research context would be 
eliminated.   
This Article also argues that Congress should adopt a regime of 
market exclusivity protection instead of the data exclusivity protection 
                                                           
1 B.Sc. McGill 2001, J.D. University of Toronto 2005, LL.M. Harvard 2009.  Mr. Morgan 
wishes to thank Professor William Fisher of Harvard Law School for his thoughtful guidance 
during the composition of this Article. 
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presently included in the new legislation. Market exclusivity would permit 
the FDA to adopt rules requiring public disclosure of both basic research 
results (which may cease to be published absent strong patent rights) and 
clinical trials data (which cannot be divulged under a data exclusivity 
regime) in exchange for FDA approval.  Such disclosure rules would 
contribute to efficient, disaggregated research into new and improved 
therapeutic approaches.      
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I. INTRODUCTION 
More than 30 years after Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer made the initial 
discoveries that ultimately led to modern techniques in biotechnology,2 the biologics 
industry is flourishing.  Biotechnology research has given and continues to give rise to a 
plethora of new human therapeutics, including gene-based therapies and recombinant 
protein products such as hormones, cellular growth factors, enzymes, clotting and anti-
clotting factors, and monoclonal antibodies.3  The importance of this industry to the 
future of medical science is buttressed by the fact that, in 2010, 50% of all new drugs 
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) are expected to be 
biologics,4 and sales of biologics are expected to exceed $60 billion.5  However, the costs 
of these products are daunting and continue to escalate, imposing substantial deadweight 
losses on patients priced out of the market, and placing large burdens on private insurers 
and government health programs.6   
Unlike the market for traditional small molecule pharmaceuticals, which has been 
increasingly subject to robust generic price competition in the wake of the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the “Hatch-Waxman Act”), the 
biologics industry has been largely impervious to generic entry and price competition, 
and has been expected to remain so even as patents on key products expire.7  The 
increasingly high cost of biologics has led many to contend that the industry’s 
imperviousness to generic competition should be remedied. 
                                                           
2 Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science, 94 Nw. U.L. Rev. 77, 93 (1999). 
3 David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to 
Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics 
and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 Food & Drug L.J. 143, 179 (2005). 
4 See Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
Bipartisan Group of Members Introduces “Promoting Innovation and Access to Life-Saving 
Medicines Act” (March 11, 2009), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1528&Itemid
=1 [hereinafter Committee on Energy and Commerce Press Release].   
5 See Henry Grabowski, Ian Cockburn, & Genia Long, The Market for Follow-On Biologics: 
How Will It Evolve?, 25 Health Aff. 1291, 1291 (2006). 
6 Biologics now cost on average 22 times more per daily dose than small molecule 
pharmaceuticals, with the most expensive costing well over $100,000 per year.  See Committee 
on Energy and Commerce Press Release, supra note 4; see also Dudzinski, supra note 3, at 144 
(noting protein-based therapeutics cost far in excess of $10,000 per year on average). 
7 Henry G. Grabowski et al., Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 Managerial 
Decision Econ. 439, 439 (2007); see also Grabowski, Cockburn & Long, supra note 5, at 1298-
99. 
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One of the main impediments to generic entry after patent expiration has been the 
absence of a clear statutory pathway to FDA approval of “follow-on” generic biologics.8  
In March 2009, in response to this regulatory lacuna, Representatives Waxman, Pallone, 
Deal, and Emerson introduced the Promoting Innovation and Access to Life-Saving 
Medicine Act, (“H.R. 1427”),9 a bill designed to empower the FDA to approve generic 
versions of biologics.  This effort followed several other attempts at follow-on biologics 
reform in prior legislative sessions.10 
In the wake of Representative Waxman’s bill, Congress took up the follow-on 
biologics issue as part of its broader efforts to reform the American healthcare system.  
As a result, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“H.R. 3590”),11 which 
recently passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and which President 
                                                           
8 In the traditional pharmaceuticals context, once patents on an originator product expire, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes the FDA to grant marketing approval to generic manufacturers 
that submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) and can demonstration that their 
follow-on products are “bioequivalent” to the originator product.  This pathway obviates the need 
for would-be generic competitors to conduct costly and redundant full-scale clinical trials in order 
to gain regulatory approval, thereby removing a core barrier to market entry.  Instead, the FDA is 
empowered to approve an ANDA on the basis of clinical data submitted by the originator firm in 
its initial New Drug Application (“NDA”).  The FDA has made it clear, however, that no 
equivalent statutory pathway currently exists for follow-on biologics.  At present, any generic 
firms wishing to introduce competing follow-on biologics are required to submit an entirely new 
Biologics Licensing Application (“BLA”) (the equivalent of an NDA for small molecule drugs), 
which requires the completion of clinical trials for safety and efficacy. The FDA’s refusal to 
permit follow-on biologics manufacturers to utilize the abbreviated Hatch-Waxman pathway 
stems from the inherent difficulty of meeting the statutory requirement of “bioequivalence” in the 
context of large bio-molecules.  See Dudzinski, supra note 3, at 193-99 (discussing regulatory 
approval regime); Grabowski, Cockburn, & Long, supra note 5, at 1292 (also discussing 
regulatory approval regime); see also U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Omnitrope (somatropin 
[rDNA origin]) Questions and Answers, May 30, 2006, http://www.legalview.info/fda-
alerts/449800/.  However, consensus is emerging that an effective abbreviated approval pathway 
can be achieved by employing a more lenient approval standard.  See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, 
Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation Implementing an Abbreviated 
Approval Pathway for Follow-on Biologics in the United States, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 555, 590-
609 (2008). 
9 Promoting Innovation and Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
10 See, e.g., Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. (2008); Patient Protection 
and Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, H.R. 1956, 110th Cong. (2007); Access to Life-
Saving Medicines Act, H.R. 1038 & S. 623, 110th Cong. (2007). 
11 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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Obama signed into law on March 23, 2010,12 contains provisions that enable the FDA to 
approve follow-on biologics products.13   
Absolutely crucial to reform of the biologics industry is the issue of how to ensure 
continued robust innovation of new biologics products.  Like the Hatch-Waxman regime 
for generic pharmaceuticals, the recently passed H.R. 3590 employs FDA data 
exclusivity protection as a regime of incentives.  However, whereas H.R. 1427 initially 
proposed the same five-year data exclusivity period for originator biologics products that 
is currently available to innovator pharmaceutical firms under the Hatch-Waxman Act,14 
Congress ultimately decided to allocate a much longer period of 12 years in H.R. 3590.15  
There is an ongoing debate as to whether such FDA exclusivity is a necessary 
mechanism to prevent erosion of incentives, or instead will be an unwarranted boon to 
the biologics industry in light of patent protections already available to innovator firms.16  
The central aim of this Article is to address the relative merits of FDA exclusivity 
compared to patent law as the appropriate primary incentive mechanism for continued 
innovation of biologics products.  Examining this issue from a law and economics 
perspective, the main thesis of this Article is that an FDA-administered exclusivity period 
of properly calibrated length is a more efficient incentive regime than either (1) the 
system in place as of the date of H.R. 3590’s passage, in which static deadweight losses 
                                                           
12 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a 
Flourish, N.Y. Times, March 23, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html. 
13 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-03, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010) (enacting Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, H.R. 3590, 111th 
Cong. (2009)). H.R. 3590 provides for the licensing of “biosimilar” and “interchangeable” 
biological products.  See id. § 7002(a)(2).  A follow-on product will be considered “biosimilar” if 
it is “highly similar” to the original product and “there are no clinically meaningful differences 
between the biological product and the [original] product in terms of the safety, purity, and 
potency of the product.”  Id. § 7002(b)(3).  A product will be considered “interchangeable” if it is 
biosimilar, it “can be expected to produce the same clinical result … in any given patient,” and 
the risk of switching the patient one or more times between the original product and the biological 
product can be expected to be not significantly greater, in terms of safety or diminished 
effectiveness, than the risk of continuing to use the original product without such switching.  Id. § 
7002(a)(2).  Approved interchangeable products “may be substituted for the [original] product 
without the intervention of the health care provider who prescribed the [original] product.”  Id. § 
7002(b)(3). 
14 See Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Detailed 
Outline of the Promoting Innovations and Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act (March 11, 2009), 
available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1528&Itemid
=1. 
15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7002(a)(2), 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
16 See Grabowski, Cockburn & Long, supra note 5, at 1293-94. 
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resulting from the biologics industry’s imperviousness to generic entry likely strongly 
outweigh any marginal incentives to innovate, or (2) a system with a mechanism for 
follow-on biologics approval, but that relies on patent law as its primary innovation 
policy tool.  One implication of this thesis is that the inclusion of a lengthy FDA 
exclusivity period for new products in H.R. 3590 is a crucial first step in ensuring 
continued robust innovation in the biologics industry.  To achieve optimal levels of 
innovation, however, a corresponding effort to reduce or eliminate reliance on patenting 
in the biologics innovation process will likely also be needed.   
The analysis in this Article is divided into two parts. In Part I, I explore the FDA’s 
role in innovation policy, and argue that employing FDA exclusivity instead of patent law 
as the primary driver of biologics innovation would remedy a number of identified 
pathologies currently associated with patenting.  In Part II, I anticipate and respond to 
potential objections to reliance on FDA exclusivity as the primary incentive tool.  Finally, 
I offer a brief summary of my conclusions. 
II. FDA EXCLUSIVITY IS SUPERIOR TO PATENT LAW 
A. FDA Regulation of Innovation 
Though the FDA is ostensibly charged with protecting patients by ensuring the 
safety and efficacy of drugs, its function as a gatekeeper for entry into therapeutic 
markets has increasingly been employed as a tool of innovation policy.17  Like patent 
law, an FDA-administered exclusivity period can effectively confer a monopoly on a 
market entrant, and thereby act as an incentive mechanism for firms to invest in the 
generation and clinical development of new medicines, and also in commercializing 
them.   
The FDA administers two forms of exclusivity as incentive mechanisms:  data 
exclusivity and market exclusivity.  The former, employed in the Hatch-Waxman regime 
and now in H.R. 3590, prevents follow-on generic firms from relying on originator 
clinical trial data to obtain FDA approval.  The latter, used under the Orphan Drug Act to 
induce investment into research on diseases with small patient populations, grants an 
applicant the exclusive right to market a product for a given clinical condition.18  Market 
exclusivity confers a broader right because it prevents even generic firms willing to 
replicate clinical trials from entering the market, whereas data exclusivity does not.19  I 
weigh the relative merits of utilizing data exclusivity and market exclusivity to stimulate 
biologics innovation in Part II, concluding that market exclusivity would be a superior 
policy.  In this part, I argue in favor of FDA-administered exclusivity of either sort, and 
                                                           
17 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 Mich. Telecomm. 
& Tech. L. Rev. 345, 348 (2007). 
18 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug 
Regulation, 19 Health Aff. 119, 123 (2001); see also Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 359-64 (2007). 
19 See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 360. 
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against patent law, as the most appropriate primary incentive structure to ensure 
continued innovation in the biologics industry. 
Before developing these arguments, it should be noted that this Article is in part 
agnostic on the appropriate length of the exclusivity period it advocates, except to say 
that the period should be calibrated to incentivize an optimal amount of investment into 
research, development, and commercialization of new biologics products, without 
needlessly extending restrictions on access to cheaper generic follow-on biologics beyond 
the point where marginal incentives are outweighed by additional deadweight loss.  Such 
a calibration is a difficult exercise and a full-scale resolution of that question is beyond 
the scope of this Article.   
Notably, the five-year exclusivity period advocated by Representative Waxman 
and the other sponsors of H.R. 1427 differs substantially from the 12-year period 
ultimately included in H.R. 3590, which tracks more closely the data exclusivity 
proposals in bills introduced in previous legislative sessions.20  It is also substantially 
lower than the minimum 14-year exclusivity period advocated by the biotechnology 
industry, whose industry organization has argued that any shorter period would lead to an 
erosion of incentives to innovate new biologics products.21  Waxman and his H.R. 1427 
co-sponsors, by contrast, have argued that the five-year Hatch-Waxman data exclusivity 
period has been associated with robust innovation in the pharmaceutical context, and that 
therefore there is no need for longer data exclusivity for biologics.  To buttress their 
argument, they point to data suggesting no difference between traditional drugs and 
biologics in terms of development costs or development timelines.22   
The sponsors of H.R. 1427 perhaps overlooked two related points when they 
advanced this argument.  First, robust innovation under the Hatch-Waxman regime might 
be occurring in spite of the overly short five-year period, because of longer periods of 
exclusivity enjoyed under pharmaceutical patent rights.  Indeed, available data has 
demonstrated that the average effective patent life of a new drug is 11.7 years.23  Second, 
a trend towards weakening patent rights and an emerging patent thicket problem in 
biomedical research, which will each be discussed further below, might lead one to 
                                                           
20 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, H.R. 1956, 
110th Cong. (2007) (granting up to 15 years of exclusivity); Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 
5629, 110th Cong. (2008) (proposing a 12-year period). 
21 See Biotechnology Indus. Org., A Follow-On Biologics Regime Without Strong Data 
Exclusivity Will Stifle the Development of New Medicines (Sept. 26, 2009) at 3-4, available at 
www.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/FOBSMarket_exclusivity_20070926.pdf [hereinafter BIO 
Follow-On Paper].  
22 See Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Q’s and 
A’s on the “Promoting Innovation and Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act” (March 11, 2009) at 
2, available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090311/Generic%20Biologics%20Q%20and%20
A.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter H.R. 1427 Q’s and A’s]. 
23 See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19 
Int'l J. Tech. Mgmt. 98, 116 (2000). 
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conclude that the patent regime is no longer adequate to confer sufficient market 
exclusivity for continued robust innovation in the life sciences industry.   
The analysis I have stated above seems to suggest that a regulatory regime 
seeking to rely on FDA exclusivity as its primary incentive mechanism should adopt a 
period of roughly 12 years in order to replicate the average effective patent life of new 
pharmaceuticals.  This is the exclusivity period ultimately included in H.R. 3590.  
Although the biotechnology industry believes this to be too short, one factor may mitigate 
their concern.  It is expected that originator biologics products will inevitably continue to 
enjoy at least quasi-monopolistic pricing even beyond FDA exclusivity or patent term 
expiration.  For example, the sponsors of H.R. 1427 anticipated that the FDA will have to 
require some level of clinical trials for at least the next several years, until advances in 
the understanding of bio-molecular structure make reliance on clinical studies 
unnecessary.24  These supplementary clinical trials, and additional barriers unique to the 
biologics context (including substantially higher fixed production costs than traditional 
pharmaceuticals),25 will make abbreviated approval significantly more costly than it is 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  As a result, modeling by Grabowski demonstrates that, 
even in the absence of FDA exclusivity or patent barriers, generic entry will be somewhat 
limited under current technological conditions, leading to sustained high pricing.26  As 
technological barriers are eliminated over time, however, the fixed costs of clinical trials 
and manufacturing will begin to recede,27 and the appropriate length of FDA exclusivity 
may need to be revisited. 
Having briefly addressed the proper length of exclusivity protection, I will use the 
remainder of this Part to set forth the arguments in favor of employing FDA exclusivity 
as the primary incentive mechanism for innovation in the biologics industry.  Part II then 
addresses the potential costs of such a regime.      
B. Arguments in Favor of FDA Exclusivity 
An FDA-administered exclusivity period should be the preferred primary 
incentive structure to promote biologics innovation because it would remedy the 
following four pathologies associated with the patenting of biomedical research:  (1) the 
anti-commons problem in “upstream” research, (2) the reduction in ex ante incentives 
due to costs associated with obtaining and litigating patents and uncertainty over whether 
patents will be invalidated, (3) the incongruence between patent law standards designed 
to reward new inventions and the need to incentivize clinical trials of new medicines 
regardless of their patentability, and (4) the incompatibility of the fixed patent term with 
                                                           
24 See H.R. 1427 Q’s and A’s, supra note 22. 
25 See BIO Follow-On Paper, supra note 21, at 5-6. 
26 See Grabowski, Cockburn & Long, supra note 5, at 1296-98; see generally, Grabowski et 
al., supra note 7. 
27 Grabowski, Cockburn & Long, supra note 5, at 1297. 
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the inevitable lag time between the early filing of patents in the drug discovery process 
and final FDA marketing approval. 
 
1. The Anti-Commons in Biomedical Research 
The controversy over deploying FDA exclusivity in the newly adopted follow-on 
biologics legislation takes place in the context of an evolving U.S. patent system.  In 
response to widespread concerns over a proliferation of unsound patents and to the 
perception that patent hold-up problems are unnecessarily stifling incentives in industries 
where innovation is primarily cumulative, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to be engaged 
in a program of tightening various patent law doctrines.28  This program of reform has led 
to the concern that the already stringent standards for patentability in the context of 
biotechnology29 will become even harder to satisfy, thereby decreasing incentives for 
innovation.30   
Despite this apparent initiative to dial back legal protection in the unitary patent 
system, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries are generally seen as areas 
where patents, and the collection of monopoly rents made possible by them, are central to 
maintaining incentives for innovation of new products.31  This perception has led to 
pressure from the life sciences industries for patent reform in the other direction.32  
Political economy considerations may render such unitary patent reform unlikely, 
however, given that the value of patents is being increasingly questioned in other sectors 
of the economy.33 
                                                           
28 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 398 (2007) (tightening 
nonobviousness standard); eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (holding 
that injunctive relief is not automatically available against patent infringers and expressing 
concern with patent hold-up problems). 
29 See, e.g., Genentech v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding the 
patent on a method for generating human growth hormone invalid for lack of enablement); 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (invalidating claims to 
a recombinant DNA version of erythropoietin for lack of enablement); Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (invalidating claims to cDNA 
sequences encoding insulin for failure to meet written description requirement); In re Fisher, 421 
F.3d 1365, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that purified cDNA Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs) 
fail to meet utility requirement of patentability); see also Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: 
Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between Innovation and Competition, 7 Nature Reviews Drug 
Discovery 479, 480 (2008) (noting constrained scope of recent biological patents). 
30 See BIO Follow-On Paper, supra note 21, at 3. 
31 See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289, 289 (2003); see also Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 
120. 
32 Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1634 (2003).   
33 Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 120. 
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In any event, strong patents in the biologics sector appear to be somewhat more of 
a mixed blessing than patent advocates assume.  The traditional model of the 
pharmaceutical innovation process, whereby originator firms obtain a small number of 
broad patents on each new promising compound and then use those patents to recoup 
their R&D investments after regulatory approval, may not graft well onto the current 
biotechnology innovation space.  The protection from competition conferred by patents 
once a product is on the market clearly remains an important source of innovation 
incentives.  However, there is growing concern that, in the wake of the passage in 1980 
of the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act (the “Bayh-Dole Act”),34 
which encourages universities and other recipients of federal research dollars to patent 
their research,35 the proliferation of intellectual property rights in “upstream” bioscience 
research—research that ultimately feeds into the development of final biologics 
products—is giving rise to “patent thickets” that are highly costly for product developers 
to navigate.  Heller and Eisenberg dubbed this phenomenon the “tragedy of the anti-
commons” in a frequently cited article in the journal Science.36  The theory underlying 
this concern is that an anti-commons (a patent thicket) will emerge when multiple patent-
holders each have a right to exclude others from using portions of an information pool.  
Because of transaction costs, strategic behavior, and cognitive biases of rights-holders, 
the theory asserts that rights will not be efficiently reallocated in such a way that the 
information pool is available for optimal use.37   
In the case of biologics R&D, drug discovery has become dependent on basic 
knowledge of genes, proteins, biochemical pathways, and molecular techniques, as well 
as inputs such as reagents, genetically engineered animals, and databases.38  In an earlier 
time, much of this upstream research would have been freely available in the public 
domain for originator firms to develop further into new therapeutic strategies.39  
However, due in part to the Bayh-Dole regime, these types of inputs are now increasingly 
the subject of patenting efforts by universities and commercial biotechnology firms (these 
firms purport to fill an important niche between fundamental research and applied drug 
discovery).  As a result, the development of commercial biologics products often requires 
the licensing of multiple upstream patents.40  Not only do these patents hinder 
downstream research by allowing owners to charge a premium for their use (causing 
                                                           
34 University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006). 
35 For a discussion of the Bayh-Dole regime, see Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 125. 
36 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698 (1998). 
37 Id. 
38 Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 289. 
39 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 36. 
40 Id. 
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some would-be users to be priced out of the market),41 they also impose search costs, 
licensing transaction costs, hold-up problems, and royalty-stacking problems on 
downstream product developers.   
The anti-commons problem is of such concern to innovator manufacturing firms 
that they have begun investing resources to produce upstream information themselves 
and place it in the public domain before universities and biotechnology companies can 
patent it.  A prime example is the effort to prevent biotechnology companies and 
universities from patenting single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”), which are useful 
in research for finding disease-specific genes and in developing diagnostic tools.  To 
prevent the patenting of SNPs, pharmaceutical companies have joined with the Wellcome 
Trust (a U.K. non-profit organization) to sponsor a consortium of researchers to identify 
SNPs and make their findings freely available.42 
Though in theory patent pools and other institutions for bundling patent rights 
could reduce transaction costs and help to overcome anti-commons problems, these 
private mechanisms have failed to materialize in the biotechnology sector.43  In fact, 
Heller and Eisenberg suggest that the enormity of the transaction costs involved, the 
heterogeneity of upstream owners, and the cognitive biases of rights-holders may prove 
to be an intractable set of problems to any future efforts at rights bundling.44 
In sum, the proliferation of upstream patenting seems to have led to a substantial 
diminution in the size of the public domain available as a starting point for applied 
R&D.45  Worse, this proliferation appears to have replaced the public domain with a 
thicket of overlapping patent claims in the hands of multiple independent owners, 
impeding originator firms’ access to basic knowledge and acting as a drag on incentives 
to develop, clinically test, and commercialize final biologics products.46  The relative 
superiority of FDA-administered exclusivity compared to patents with respect to this 
anti-commons problem lies in the ability of FDA exclusivity to offer similar monopoly 
protection to originator biologics firms as an incentive to gain regulatory approval 
without the associated drag on incentives due to early-stage patenting.  In a unitary patent 
                                                           
41 Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 295. 
42 Id. at 298. 
43 Id. 
44 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 36. 
45 It should be noted that some authors have questioned whether the current evidence 
establishing the existence of tragedy of the anti-commons problems in upstream biomedical 
research is large enough to warrant concern.  See, e.g., Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of 
Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology 
Innovation, 38 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 141, 174-94 (2004) (reviewing the evidence and finding it 
ambivalent). 
46 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 36; see also, generally, Arti K. Rai, Fostering 
Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 813, 813 (2001), available at http://eprints.law.duke.edu/1512/ (supporting 
the criticality of competition in the field of biopharmaceutal patents). 
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system, it would be difficult to fine tune patents such that the strength of final product 
patents was enhanced without also enhancing the strength of their upstream patent 
counterparts.47  FDA exclusivity, by contrast, specifically tailors incentives to reward 
successful end-product development.  This analysis suggests that gradual retrenchment of 
patent law in the biotechnology sector, combined with strong FDA exclusivity as an 
incentive to bring finished products to market, is the optimal regulatory structure.   
 
2. Costs of Patent Enforcement 
In addition to the potentially prohibitive transaction costs arising from biomedical 
anti-commons, biologics products developers face substantial costs associated with 
prosecuting and enforcing patents on products they seek to bring to market.  One 
potentially alarming example of these types of costs is the frequency of patent challenges 
by generic pharmaceutical firms under the Hatch-Waxman regime.48  The prospect of 
having to either pursue these lawsuits and risk patent invalidation or enter into costly 
reverse-payment settlements with generic challengers almost certainly reduces ex ante 
incentives to innovate.  Additionally, the biotechnology industry organization has 
expressed concern that patent protection is narrower for biologics products than for 
pharmaceuticals and that, as a result, generic manufacturers will be able to easily design 
around biologics product patents to avoid infringement liability should biologics 
innovators attempt to litigate.49  This concern may be overblown in light of the fact that, 
in order to rely on an originator’s clinical data for abbreviated approval, a generic 
biologics company will still have to establish “biosimilarity” under H.R. 3590.  It is 
unclear why one should expect this standard to be interpreted more broadly than the 
scope of biologics product patents. 
In any event, utilizing FDA exclusivity as the primary incentive mechanism to 
drive innovation should entirely eliminate the above-discussed costs and uncertainty. 
Under FDA exclusivity, firms are relieved of the need to vigorously pursue patenting 
strategies and patent litigation in order to ensure their ability to recoup investment costs.  
They need not factor uncertainty over potential future invalidation of their patents and 
over potential future inability to secure infringement verdicts into their ex ante 
development and commercialization investment decisions.  In fact, FDA exclusivity is 
guaranteed to any firms that successfully gain regulatory approval of new biologics.  In 
contrast to the substantial costs associated with patenting, the only costs of obtaining 
FDA exclusivity are the expenditures necessary to comply with FDA marketing approval 
procedures, which firms must bear in any event to market their products.  
 
                                                           
47 See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 124. 
48 See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553,1553 (2006), available at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/faculty_franke/Legal_Scholarship/Paying_For_Delay.pdf; see 
also Grabowski, Cockburn & Long, supra note 5, at 1295-96. 
49 See BIO Follow-On Paper, supra note 21, at 1. 
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3. Unpatentable Biologics 
Another important pathology associated with relying on the patent system as the 
primary incentive mechanism is that it leads to under-investment in clinical testing and 
commercialization of unpatentable drugs.  This would not be a relevant concern if there 
were perfect congruence between the requirements of patentability (which incentivize the 
invention of new therapeutic candidates) and the need to incentivize the stages of product 
development between initial discovery and marketing approval.  This is not the case, 
however.  There are a host of reasons why a promising therapeutic candidate may fail 
patentability requirements, including prior disclosure through publication or the advent of 
recent scientific advances that make the candidate appear obvious in hindsight.  Yet the 
relationship between the patentability of a therapeutic candidate and its potential social 
value if advanced through clinical testing is tenuous at best.  Absent patent protection, 
any incentives to invest the enormous sums required to conduct clinical trials evaporate,50 
and, as a result, the social value that could be realized if these unpatentable products were 
brought to market is lost.51  Indeed, this problem may be exacerbated in the current 
climate of receding patent strength, should a higher number of potential biologics 
products fail to meet the requirements of patentability. 
One solution would be to relax the requirements of patentability in order to 
increase the number of candidate therapeutics with strong patent protection.  This 
solution would be a blunt instrument, however.  First, it could inflame the anti-commons 
and patent enforcement pathologies discussed above.  Moreover, it would likely only 
partially remedy the problem given the structural discordance between patent law’s goal 
of incentivizing the generation of new and non-obvious ideas, and the specific need in the 
biologics industry to promote downstream clinical testing and the commercialization of 
ideas.  FDA exclusivity, by contrast, better tailors incentives for firms to bear these 
downstream development, regulatory approval, and commercialization costs for any 
socially valuable new drug, regardless of whether it meets the standards of patentability.52   
 
4. Time Lag Between Patenting and Regulatory Approval 
Finally, relying on patents to incentivize biologics research and development 
suffers from the problem that there is a significant lag time between the date a patent 
application on a potential new product is filed and the date of FDA regulatory approval.53  
                                                           
50 The average cost of clinical trials exceeds all other costs of developing a new biologics 
product combined.  See Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of 
Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 Managerial Decision Econ. 469, 469 (2007), 
available at http://ideas.respec.org/a/wly/hlthec/v28y2007i4-5p469-479.html/. 
51 See generally Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 
87 Texas L. Rev. 503, 503 (2009), available at 
http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/issues/vol87/pdf/roin.pdf  (providing an in-depth 
discussion of this phenomenon in the pharmaceutical industry). 
52 See id. at 564-69. 
53 See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 351. 
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Because the patent term is fixed at 20 years from the date of filing, the longer the 
development and approval horizon for a new drug, the shorter the period of post-approval 
market exclusivity an innovator firm enjoys. The effect of this inverse relationship is that 
there are robust incentives to invest in gaining approval of therapeutics for which clinical 
trial results are likely to be achieved quickly, whereas there are insufficient incentives to 
develop and market potentially socially valuable new therapeutics whose development 
timelines are too long.54   
The Hatch-Waxman regime attempts to correct for this problem in the 
pharmaceuticals context by allocating patent term extensions of up to five years for 
delays in the regulatory approval process.55  Yet this approach is only partially 
successful, given that regulatory delay is just one of several factors that feed into the lag 
time between patenting and market sales, and given that the lag time can eat up far more 
than five years of a patent term. 
FDA exclusivity, by contrast, better alleviates this patent system pathology by 
allocating a uniform period of monopoly protection to firms who invest in the clinical 
development and commercialization of biologics products, regardless of how long it takes 
to move the product from the lab to the marketplace.  Under this uniform monopoly 
period, one ought to witness a partial shift of resources away from projects with short 
clinical timelines towards some of the more daunting, yet more socially valuable, clinical 
projects whose length may be long relative to the patent term.  In fact, an optimal 
approach would have the FDA tailor the length of the exclusivity period to the time and 
costs of clinical research and development.  Such a regime may prove difficult to 
administer, however, and the specifics of how it might be achieved are beyond the scope 
of this Article.  
 
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
Part I developed a series of arguments in favor of employing FDA exclusivity as 
the primary incentive mechanism for biologics innovation.  Reliance on FDA exclusivity 
instead of patent law may, however, give rise to a number of pathologies of its own, 
including:  (1) erosion of incentives for upstream research absent strong patent 
protection, (2) dissipation, via rent-seeking behavior prior to obtaining FDA marketing 
approval, of the very same social gains associated with increased innovation under FDA 
                                                           
54 See Benjamin N. Roin, The Perverse Incentives Created by the Patent Term for Drugs (Feb. 
19, 2009) (preliminary draft paper presented to Health Law & Policy Workshop at Harvard Law 
School); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law 300 (2003) (discussing the related proposition that, despite correlation 
between the fixed costs of R&D and the degree of patent protection required to create adequate 
incentives, the patent system does not tailor patent protection to fixed costs of R&D). 
55 For a discussion of Hatch-Waxman patent term restoration, see Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 
352. 
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exclusivity, and (3) impairment in the disclosure of socially valuable information 
encouraged by patents.  This Part examines and addresses each of these in turn. 
A. Upstream Incentives 
A first—and potentially powerful—critique of the regime this Article advocates is 
that a weakening of patent rights in the upstream stages of biotechnology innovation, and 
primary reliance on downstream FDA exclusivity instead, could lead to a collapse of 
incentives to invent research tools and other inputs into the creation of final biologics 
products.  In the long term, such a collapse might ultimately lead to fewer candidate 
biologics products being generated for clinical testing, despite the availability of FDA 
exclusivity at the end of the process. 
This concern is unwarranted, however, because other factors are likely to 
encourage robust upstream innovation in the absence of patent rights.  The costs 
associated with recognizing property rights in upstream research (discussed in Part I, 
supra) should only be borne where the production and dissemination of information at 
this stage would be suboptimal in the absence of rights.56  This Part argues that robust 
upstream biotechnology innovation will occur in the absence of patent rights for two 
reasons:  (1) norms favoring scientific invention and open disclosure of the fruits of 
federally-funded basic biomedical research will ensure continued generation of upstream 
knowledge; and (2) strategic partnership arrangements between small biotechnology 
companies and originator manufacturing firms will convert upstream knowledge to 
downstream biologics candidates. 
 
1. The Norms of Science 
Prior to the 1980s and the enactment of Bayh-Dole, basic molecular biology 
research was mostly governed by a system of norms adhered to by the academic scientific 
community.  This normative system, though now in retreat, still exists.  Its primary 
characteristics are that it:  (1) discourages secrecy because of its inconsistency with the 
goals of feedback and independent verification, (2) denounces as immoral the assertion of 
rights in scientific discovery, (3) promotes the free dissemination of scientific 
information, and (4) lavishes the highest respect and recognition on those who make 
original contributions to scientific invention.  Importantly, this last norm incentivizes 
scientists to vigorously compete to disclose their inventions.57  Examples of these norms 
in action include:  (1) Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer expressing skepticism about 
patenting gene-splicing techniques and demanding that those techniques be licensed non-
exclusively and (2) Georges Kohler and Cesar Milstein, the developers of monoclonal 
antibody technology, determining that it was inappropriate to seek patents on their 
invention.58  The thrust of these examples is that foundational biotechnology R&D was 
                                                           
56 See Landes & Posner, supra note 54, at 24.   
57 For a more in-depth treatment of this norm system, see Rai, supra note 2, at 88-94. 
58 Id. at 93-94. 
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not motivated by the promise of patents.  Rather, other incentive structures, such as the 
desire for widespread respect and recognition, and the federal government’s subsidization 
of basic research at universities and research institutes, were filling the gap.59 
Things began to change significantly when, in 1980, the Supreme Court signaled 
a favorable attitude towards patenting genetic technologies.60  Congress then passed the 
Bayh-Dole Act to encourage patenting of research conducted with federal sponsorship.61   
The rationale behind Bayh-Dole was not to incentivize basic science research, which was 
already robust.  Rather, Bayh-Dole stemmed from a perception that the traditional 
normative system of open science was inefficient in terms of producing marketable 
products.  The fear was that, because public disclosure preempted patenting, private firms 
would have little incentive to spend resources developing research ideas already in the 
public domain.62 
Since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, intellectual property claims have 
permeated upstream research and the norms of scientific inquiry have been crowded out.  
Universities and federal grant recipients have sought patents on research inputs such as 
DNA sequences, protein structures, and disease pathways, converting to property what 
was once the domain of open science.63  Specifically, in order to obtain patents, many of 
these actors have eschewed the norm of open disclosure, instead keeping scientific 
knowledge secret and refusing to share research material.64   
Once patents are obtained, universities seek licensing agreements involving 
royalties or cash payments to transfer research tools to private industry.65  Many argue 
that a large number of these upstream inventions were not difficult to identify and would 
have been developed regardless.66  A relevant example is the discovery of the BRCA-1 
and BRCA-2 breast cancer genes at the University of Utah and its exclusive license with 
Myriad Genetics.67  The American Civil Liberties Union recently brought a lawsuit on 
behalf of a number of plaintiffs, including patients, universities, researchers, and medical 
                                                           
59 Id. at 119. 
60 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980). 
61 University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006). 
62 See Rai, supra note 2, at 95-96. 
63 See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 289-91. 
64 See Rai, supra note 2, at 109-10. 
65 See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 294. 
66 See Rai, supra note 2, at 119. 
67 See CNN, ACLU Sues Over Patents on Breast Cancer Genes (May 13, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/05/12/us.genes.lawsuit/index.html. 
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associations, challenging the constitutionality of the patents on those genes.68  They argue 
that Myriad and the University of Utah Research Foundation are using their patents to 
limit potentially valuable downstream research and to inhibit the free flow of information 
in violation of the First Amendment.69  Additionally, the upstream patents on these genes 
have increased the cost of preventative genetic screening for women to upwards of 
$3,000 per test.70  It is unclear, however, whether the patents were necessary to motivate 
either the discovery of the BRCA genes or the subsequent research conducted upon them, 
potentially rendering the associated costs unjustified.71     
At a more fundamental level, widespread patenting in the wake of Bayh-Dole 
may actually be causing federally funded researchers to shift their efforts away from 
basic science and towards more applied work, which could cause large social losses in 
the long term as fewer foundational discoveries are made.72  Collective action problems 
likely stand in the way of individual institutions or researchers foregoing these patenting 
opportunities in favor of the public domain, however.73   
The best solution to this set of problems is the removal of patent law from this 
space coupled with the reintroduction of scientific norms.74  A unitary weakening of 
patent rights may partially achieve this, but a full-scale shift back in the direction of open 
science likely requires amendment or repeal of the Bayh-Dole Act.  Under these 
conditions, federal funding and the norms of scientific inquiry could step in to assure 
                                                           
68 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, No. 09-4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
35418, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010). 
69 Id. at *17-18, *162. 
70 Id. at *58.  
71 On March 29, 2010, District Court Judge Robert Sweet issued a decision invalidating the 
patents on the BRCA-1 and BRCA-2 genes as improperly covering “laws of nature.”  Ass'n for 
Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, No. 09-4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010), amended by Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, No. 
09-4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010); see also John Schwartz & 
Andrew Pollack, Judge Invalidates Human Gene Patent, N.Y. Times, March 29, 2010, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/business/30gene.html?src=me&ref=general.  If ultimately 
upheld on appeal, this ruling could have broad implications for biologics innovation, and could 
potentially help to alleviate some of the anti-commons problems associated with gene patenting. 
72 See Landes & Posner, supra note 54, at 316. 
73 See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 305. 
74 Research inputs such as genes, ESTs, SNPs, reagents, and the like, should probably be 
distinguished from other inputs into the biologics innovation process, such as laboratory 
machinery (gene sequencing equipment, microscopes, etc).  The latter may be better candidates 
for continued patenting because of the need to incentivize substantial private investment to 
develop them.  See id. at 302.  That said, other barriers to entry, such as lead time, fixed 
manufacturing costs, and brand loyalty, may sufficiently protect manufacturers of laboratory 
machinery so as to make patent law unnecessary. 
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continued, robust generation and dissemination of the kinds of basic science discoveries 
that serve as inputs into downstream biologics product development.  Moreover, the 
policy rationale for Bayh-Dole (encouraging commercialization of government-
sponsored inventions)75 would not be impaired.  While it is true that suboptimal levels of 
technology transfer occurred in the pre-Bayh-Dole era, this was likely a consequence of 
the doctrine of anticipation in patent law, which makes it impossible to obtain patents on 
publicly disclosed technological discoveries.  Unable to rely on patents to recoup 
development and commercialization costs, firms would naturally shy away from 
investing in university-generated science that had already been published.  Deploying 
FDA exclusivity as an incentive for downstream product development, however, helps 
eliminate this paradox by protecting biologic product developers from free-riding 
competition once products are brought to market, regardless of whether the technologies 
at the heart of those products are patented.  Investment in the commercialization of 
publicly generated technology is thus incentivized without the costs associated with 
upstream patenting.   
 
2. Strategic Partnerships 
A potential objection to this solution is that it ignores the role of small 
biotechnology companies in converting publicly generated science into commercial 
applications.  Small biotechnology companies are playing an increasingly important role 
in filling the innovation space between the research conducted at universities and the 
product development being done at large manufacturing firms.76  Indeed, there are 
currently more than 1,500 biotechnology companies in the U.S., most of which are 
relatively small.77  These companies rely extensively on patent portfolios to attract 
venture financing and equity capital.  The important function carried out by these 
biotechnology firms could therefore be impaired without strong patent protection, to the 
detriment of downstream product innovation.   
This objection at first appears strong, and, to be dealt with adequately, likely 
requires a more in-depth treatment than can be offered here.  Nonetheless, this Article 
will attempt a preliminary answer to it.  First, though patents seem central to start-up 
biotech firms’ ability to secure venture funding,78 a far larger source of capital for these 
firms comes from the partnership alliances they maintain with large pharmaceutical and 
biologics manufacturers.79  In fact, start-up firms often experience difficulty attracting 
venture and equity financing until they secure their first strategic alliance with a large 
                                                           
75 Id. at 290. 
76 See Grabowski, Cockburn & Long, supra note 5, at 1294. 
77 See Dudzinski, supra note 3, at 178. 
78 See Grabowski, Cockburn & Long, supra note 5, at 1299. 
79 See Nadine Roijakkers & John Hagedoorn, Inter-Firm R&D Partnering in Pharmaceutical 
Biotechnology Since 1975: Trends, Patterns, and Networks, 35 Res. Pol’y 431, 433 (2006), 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/respol/v35y2006i3p431-446.html. 
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originator firm.  The structure of the biotech innovation space has evolved such that large 
manufacturers act as nodal players with multiple strategic partnerships with upstream 
biotechnology companies.80  As evidence of the fruits of this structure, as of 2005, thirty 
percent of traditional pharmaceutical industry revenue was derived from biologics 
products obtained through partnership deals with smaller biotechnology companies.81   
Despite the current reliance on patenting in this area, there is no reason to suppose 
that small biotech players could not protect the research conducted at this stage of the 
innovative process with trade secrecy law and contractual secrecy provisions instead. 
Under the incentive regime advocated by this Article, large manufacturers would 
continue to have incentives to partner with these companies (or to acquire them through 
M&A transactions) in order to enrich product pipelines, because any therapeutic 
candidates developed as trade secrets would later be protected by FDA exclusivity on the 
market.   
Any concern that reliance on trade secrecy law causes innovators to shift 
resources away from research into products that can be easily reverse engineered (such as 
therapeutics) is unwarranted in this context.  With FDA exclusivity employed as the 
primary incentive structure for finished biologics products, a candidate therapeutic 
approach need only be protected as a trade secret until the time of FDA regulatory 
approval, at which point disclosure would become irrelevant because the exclusivity 
period prevents reverse engineers from entering the market.  Prior to FDA approval, 
potential reverse engineers could not access the product through market purchases, and 
so, with appropriate secrecy measures in place, ease of copying should be of no concern 
to developers.   
Separately, there is evidence that inter-firm network formation and the free 
dissemination of knowledge through such networks is key to robust innovation at 
successful small biotech companies.82  The role that patents may play in either advancing 
or retarding both network formation and knowledge dissemination seems ambiguous, and 
potentially deleterious. This further confounds the actual value of patents in this 
innovative space.   
                                                           
80 Id. at 431;  See also William W. McCutchen Jr. & Paul M. Swamidass, Motivations for 
Strategic Alliances in the Pharmaceutical/Biotech Industry: Some New Findings, 15 J. High 
Tech. Mgmt. Res. 197, 197 (2004), available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W56-4CGMG5B-
1&_user=18704&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrI
d=1116398852&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000002018&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_useri
d=18704&md5=c79578deec392a114002202c2ad3c8b1. 
81 See Kerry A. Dolan, Drug Alliance Alchemy, Forbes, June 19, 2005, 
http://www.forbes.com/2005/06/19/pharma-biotech-alliances-cz_kd_0619pharma.html. 
82 See, e.g., Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. Powell, Knowledge Networks as Channels and 
Conduits: The Effects of Spillovers in the Boston Biotechnology Community, 15 Org. Sci. 5, 5 
(2004), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~woodyp/papers/knowledge_nets.pdf; Maija Renko, 
Malin Brannback & Alan Carsrud, Sources, Development and Uses of Innovation in Modern 
Biotechnology, 1 Int. J. Tech. Mgmt. 345, 345 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344652.  
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2010 
 
 112 
In sum, though the concern that patenting is important to the small biotechnology 
sector initially seems well-founded, it is actually less damaging to this Article’s proposal 
when one considers that, with FDA exclusivity as the primary incentive mechanism for 
product development, other business models employing trade secrecy and contracting can 
fill the biotech niche in order to create vibrant product pipelines.  Potential difficulties 
confronting a secrecy model of this sort are discussed further below.  First, however, this 
Part analyzes the potential problem of rent dissipation. 
 
B. Rent Dissipation 
A second potentially powerful critique of an incentive regime that combines FDA 
exclusivity with weak patent rights is that the absence of strong upstream patents might 
cause rent-dissipating competition to obtain FDA approval.  This critique is rooted in the 
prospect theory of patent law, which posits that broad exclusive rights should be granted 
early in the inventive process because they permit efficient coordination of downstream 
research activities through licensing transactions by rights-holders.83  Otherwise, the 
theory holds, competition between firms seeking to acquire those monopoly rents 
associated with being the first to commercialize an invention (in this case, because FDA 
exclusivity will confer product monopolies) will consume all or most of the potential 
social gains from that invention, converting expenses incurred by the losers of the race 
into deadweight social losses.84   
This prospect theory of the economic function of patents, however, likely does not 
accurately portray their utility in the early and applied stages of biomedical research.  
Arti Rai has advanced a critique of this theory in biomedical research, which, when 
combined with my proposal to employ FDA exclusivity as the primary regime of 
incentives, weighs strongly against the need for strong upstream biotechnology patents.  
Her critique and its implications are explored below.  Prospect theory may have more 
currency, though, when it comes to coordinating clinical trial testing of new candidate 
therapeutics because of the greater potential for rent-seeking behavior at this stage that 
would reduce social welfare.  This too will be explored further below.  Finally, potential 
rent dissipation issues after FDA approval are another concern that will be addressed 
below. 
First, Arti Rai has advanced a compelling argument against the applicability of 
prospect theory with respect to upstream patenting in biomedical science.  Her evidence 
suggests that “coordination by a single rights-holder undermines scientific creativity in 
both basic and applied research.”85  It appears that basic biomedical science occurs most 
quickly and most effectively when independent teams of scientists employ different 
                                                           
83 See, e.g., Edmund Kitsch, Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & Econ. 265, 
267-71 (1977). 
84 See Landes & Posner, supra note 54, at 17. 
85 See Rai, supra note 2, at 123. 
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approaches to the same or similar problems.  Indeed, many scholars argue that innovation 
in this space is best understood as an evolutionary, or quasi-Darwinian, process of trial 
and error.86  This view implies that many independent sources of inventive activity are 
superior to an early patentee directing a centralized process, in part because the 
prospector may have a flawed conception of the optimal path for future development, 
leading to a retardation of technological progress.87  As discussed in Part I, supra, 
transaction costs and anti-commons problems may also inhibit the efficient allocation of 
upstream information to downstream developers, further stalling technical advance.88  To 
place this argument into economic parlance, vigorous competition at these stages of 
research does not dissipate social gains, but instead either sufficiently speeds up 
innovation or produces a sufficient number of otherwise unavailable inventions, such that 
the increase in present value from competition offsets the added costs of uncoordinated 
research.   
Rai suggests that this same logic holds for the more applied stages of 
biotechnology.  In other words, taking an embryonic idea and converting it to potential 
therapeutic uses occurs most efficiently when many different teams or firms are 
independently investigating the issue.89  Rai and Eisenberg discuss the example of the 
broad initial patent rights granted to the University of Wisconsin Research Foundation 
over pluripotent embryonic stem cell technology (a broad new territory of scientific 
inquiry).  These rights were exclusively licensed to Geron Corporation, which, they 
argue, led to inefficiencies in developing that technology that could have been avoided by 
placing it in the public domain.90 
Rai offers a useful framework for determining whether to grant upstream 
exclusive rights:  any increased incentives (1) to devise basic research ideas in the first 
place and (2) to develop those initial ideas into useful products, should be compared to 
and balanced with (3) the costs of reduced creativity in developing uses for those ideas as 
a result of the loss of independent investigation and (4) the transaction costs of creating 
coordinated research through reallocation of rights.91   
Applying Rai’s framework to the biotechnology innovation process, granting 
exclusive rights in upstream research ideas is unlikely to be justifiable.  For the reasons 
discussed above, these ideas are likely to be generated anyway because research at this 
stage is federally subsidized, because the costs of deriving these ideas are likely to be 
relatively low, and because the norms of scientific inquiry are likely to incentivize their 
creation in the absence of patents.  The costs of converting initial discoveries into 
                                                           
86 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 873-79 (1990); Landes & Posner, supra note 54, at 318. 
87 See Landes & Posner, supra note 54, at 319. 
88 See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 297. 
89 See Rai, supra note 2, at 124-25. 
90 See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 293, 309. 
91 See Rai, supra note 2, at 136-37. 
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therapeutic candidates, however, are likely to be high in biotechnology.  Rai argues that 
these high costs do not justify granting exclusive rights to prospectors, though, because 
the creativity costs and transaction costs associated with doing so will outweigh any 
marginal increased incentives for development.92   
Her argument carries even more weight with FDA exclusivity employed as the 
primary incentive mechanism for biologics innovation.  If strategic partnership 
arrangements and trade secrecy (discussed supra Part II.A.2), combined with the promise 
of FDA exclusivity, can step in as incentives for biotechnology firms to develop and 
refine basic science ideas into clinical candidates, concerns that the absence of patents 
would deter product developers from investing in this stage of the innovative process 
should dissolve.  Firms would bear these costs without patent protection because of the 
promise of FDA exclusivity, and, as such, the creativity and transaction costs caused by 
patenting upstream inventions would represent unjustified deadweight loss. 
Rai’s framework plays out differently when applied to the clinical trials phase, 
however, and suggests that an exclusive right is preferable once a candidate therapeutic is 
ready for clinical testing.  First, the creativity costs associated with only one firm 
controlling the conduct of clinical trials are likely to be relatively low because a 
therapeutic strategy has already been developed and clinical design is relatively 
straightforward.  Moreover, the additional transaction costs associated with an exclusive 
right at this stage should be relatively low because of the absence of troubling 
downstream anti-commons issues and because of the relatively few licenses required to 
facilitate a drug trial.  In contrast, the cost of conducting clinical trials is enormous.  The 
promise of FDA exclusivity should incentivize firms to bear those costs, but the social 
gains from bringing products through this phase could be entirely dissipated if multiple 
independent teams routinely conducted clinical trials on the same therapeutic candidate.   
Rai’s framework therefore suggests that it would be efficient to allocate 
prospecting rights to firms at the moment a product is ready for clinical testing.  One 
relatively simple way to achieve this is to adopt a rule that the FDA cannot register the 
same product for more than one clinical trial.93  This rule would prevent rent-dissipating 
competition while maintaining incentives to conduct clinical trials in order to gain FDA 
exclusivity upon marketing approval. 
One final area in which a regime of FDA exclusivity combined with weak patent 
rights might cause socially deleterious rent dissipation is the period after a biologics 
product gains FDA marketing approval (i.e., once the product has completed clinical 
trials and is on the market).  With data exclusivity employed as the primary incentive 
mechanism, competitors may have strong incentives to reverse engineer particularly 
profitable blockbuster biologics products, to independently conduct clinical trials on 
them, and then to seek FDA approval with an entirely independent licensing application 
(instead of utilizing the abbreviated pathway available under H.R. 3590), all to capture 
some of the monopoly rents accruing to the original innovator.  In fact, this kind of 
activity had already been observed prior to H.R. 3590’s passage.  Despite the absence of 
a regime for follow-on biologics, six generic manufactures of human growth hormone 
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(“hGH”) were able to obtain regulatory approval from the FDA by conducting their own 
comprehensive Phase III clinical studies to demonstrate safety and efficacy.94   
The costs of redundant trials of this nature are likely to represent deadweight 
social loss if the trials all simply generate the same information about safety and efficacy.  
Moreover, the prospect of generic firms entering the market in this manner might reduce 
ex ante incentives for biologics innovators.  The simplest way to remedy this form of rent 
dissipation would be to adopt FDA market exclusivity as the primary incentive 
mechanism, instead of the FDA data exclusivity protection contained in H.R. 3590.  As 
discussed in Part I, a market exclusivity rule would prevent the FDA from granting 
regulatory approval to the same therapeutic compound during a specified period, 
regardless of whether a would-be competitor conducted independent clinical trials. 
C. Disclosure 
A third potential critique of the incentive regime advocated by this Article is that 
the benefits of the disclosure function of patents might be lost because firms will elect to 
protect as much information as possible by trade secrecy.95  While the production of 
conventional small molecule drugs has proven relatively straightforward, the 
manufacturing processes for larger bio-molecules are much more complicated.96  This 
complexity could make biologics significantly more difficult to reverse engineer for 
would-be generic producers, who would otherwise have access to information disclosed 
in patents to assist them in developing follow-on products.  This disclosure concern has 
merit, but can be dealt with in the following manner. 
First, in the absence of upstream patents, the norms of scientific inquiry can be 
expected to encourage innovation and disclosure at the basic research phase.97  Second, 
trade secrecy would indeed be expected to replace patent law as a mechanism to protect 
innovation by small biotechnology companies in the stages of innovation that take basic 
research and convert it to clinical trial-ready therapeutic candidates.98  This concern 
should be mitigated, however, by the fact that the length of this applied research stage is 
likely to be relatively short, and in any event far less than the 20-year patent term.  While 
patenting at this stage forces disclosure, the resultant patents permit their holders to 
exclude other would-be researchers from using the disclosed information, and there is no 
meaningful experimental use exception in the U.S. to mitigate that problem.99   
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Third, trade secrecy strategies after FDA marketing approval, which should be the 
most pressing concern, could be avoided by adopting the following three rules:  1) FDA 
market exclusivity instead of data exclusivity as the incentive mechanism, 2) a 
requirement that, in exchange for market exclusivity, firms disclose any manufacturing 
trade secrets necessary to make the product, and surrender any patents held on the 
product into the public domain, and 3) a requirement that the FDA publish all clinical 
trial data submitted for the purpose of gaining approval.   
The second and third rules are designed to effectuate socially beneficial disclosure 
by innovator biologics firms.  Under the second rule, disclosure of manufacturing trade 
secrets and product patents would (1) facilitate generic entry after expiration of the FDA 
exclusivity period, and (2) enable open, disaggregated research into new uses for, and 
improvements of, therapeutic products.  Presently, the FDA treats clinical trial data 
submitted by originator firms as proprietary and not subject to disclosure.100  By 
encouraging disclosure of this information, the third rule would lead to the following 
social gains:  (1) doctors, patients, and insurers would have more information at their 
disposal to make informed drug choices, (2) firms could learn from each other’s clinical 
trial experiences and use that information to design better clinical trials, (3) independent 
analyses and scrutiny of clinical trial results and regulatory decisions could be conducted, 
and (4) large-scale meta-analyses of data aggregated from multiple studies of related 
products could be carried out.101  The first rule (FDA market exclusivity instead of data 
exclusivity) would be necessary to make feasible the second and third rules.  Data 
exclusivity as the primary incentive mechanism is incompatible with these latter rules 
because a free-riding generic competitor (1) could use disclosed manufacturing secrets to 
produce copies of a new originator therapeutic, (2) could use disclosed clinical data to 
obtain independent regulatory approval of its version, and (3) could not be enjoined from 
doing so with the originator’s patents as those patents would have been surrendered.  A 
market exclusivity rule, by contrast, would permit full disclosure while retaining 
monopoly protection for the originator, since disclosed research and data could not be 
used to produce and register a generic version until after the expiration of the exclusivity 
period. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Reform of the biologics industry to facilitate follow-on generic competition has 
begun with the passage of H.R. 3590, with potentially large benefits accruing to patients, 
insurers, and government health programs as a result.  It is imperative, however, that 
policy-makers ensure that the new regime fosters continued innovation of new biologics 
products.  The goal of this Article has been to persuade its audience that FDA exclusivity 
is superior to patent law as the primary incentive mechanism for continued biologics 
innovation.  A comparison of these two regimes has hopefully demonstrated that FDA 
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exclusivity has the potential to (1) remedy the increasing anti-commons problems in 
upstream biomedical research, (2) alleviate costs and uncertainties associated with 
patenting, (3) better align incentives with clinical development of socially valuable 
medicines, and (4) partially counteract the tendency of firms to eschew lengthy clinical 
projects because of the fixed patent term. The central implication of this analysis is that 
continued retrenchment in the scope of available patent protections, combined with the 
FDA exclusivity regime contained in H.R. 3590, should be the preferred policy approach 
for future biologics innovation.   
This Article has also explained the potential pitfalls associated with primary 
reliance on FDA exclusivity, and has sought to either show that those pitfalls can be 
overcome with simple policy prescriptions, or to question whether they are even germane 
to the biologics innovation context.  First, incentives at the upstream stages of biomedical 
research are likely to remain robust because of the system of norms governing the 
creation and public disclosure of basic scientific inquiry and because of the potential for 
strategic alliances between small biotechnology companies and large drug manufacturers 
to incentivize the refinement of basic science into therapeutic pipelines.  Second, rent 
dissipation is unlikely to impose major costs in the pre-clinical phases of biologics 
research because of the importance of multiple, independent lines of inquiry to efficient 
scientific progress.  Rent dissipation at the clinical trials and post-marketing approval 
stages can be reduced or eliminated by (1) adopting a rule that the FDA cannot authorize 
more than one firm to conduct clinical trials on the same product, and (2) adopting a rule 
of FDA market exclusivity instead of data exclusivity to prevent would-be competitors 
from conducting rent-dissipating, redundant clinical trials to gain regulatory approval.  
Third, and finally, though patents play an important role in creating incentives for firms 
to reveal their innovations to the public, efficient disclosure of the fruits of biologics 
research can still be maintained in the absence of patent law if Congress adopts (1) FDA 
market exclusivity instead of data exclusivity, (2) a rule requiring surrender of 
manufacturing trade secrets and any patent rights in biologics products in exchange for 
FDA exclusivity, and (3) a rule requiring the FDA to disclose clinical trial data. 
